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[60 C.2d 631; 36 C .. I.Uptr. 201. 3eS P.2d 331 
[Crim. No. 7339. In Bank. Jan. 7, 1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH 
BERNARD MORSE, Defendant and Appellant. 
[la-1d] Criminal Law-Punisrunent-Procedure for Determining 1 I 
Penalty-Instructions.-On the penalty phase of a first de-: i 
gree murder case, it was reversible error to give an instruc-
tion and to allow evidence and argument which permitted the 
jury to consider the possibility that the Adult Authority might 
at some future date, grant a parole to defendant if he were 
given a life sentence; whether or not a prisoner is granted 
parole is a matter lying within the expert judgment of the 
Adult Authority, not within the jury's province, and instruc-
tions and evidence of the Authority's possible grant of parole 
invite speculative argument to the jury and surmi.3e by it of 
the possible improper release of a defendant to society in ti,l' 
future. (Disapproving, to the extent they conflict with thi~ 
opinion, People v. Hamilton (1963) allte, pp. 105, 135 [32 Cal. 
Rptr.4, 383 P.2d 412]; People v. Purvis (1963) ante. pp. ::123. 
350 [33 Cal.Rptr. 104, 384 P.2d 424]; People v. Jack'</Jn (19i>3) 
59 Ca1.2d 375, 378 [29 Ca1.Rptr. 505,379 P.2d 0371; People 
v. Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal.2d 503, 543 [30 Ca1.Rpt]'. 538, 381 
P.2d 394]; People v. JIodesto (1963) 59 Ca1.2(\ 722. 735 [31 
Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]; People v. Gaines (1062) 58 Ca1.2d 
630,637 [25 Cal.Rptr. 448, 375 P.2d 296]; P('tJ};le Y. Lore (1961 ) 
56 Ca1.2d 720, 726 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.R?tr. 481, 366 
P.2d 33, 809J; People v. Purvis (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 93, 96 [13 
Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713]; People v. Rolli1kl'd (HHlU) 55 
Ca1.2d 88, 102 [10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 2(5); People Y. 
Scotf (1960) 53 Cal.2d 558, 566 [2 Ca1.Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d 
882J; People v. Chessman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 467, 495 [341 
P.2d 679J; People v. Purds (1959) 52 Cal.2d 871, 884 [346 
P.2d 22]; People v. Turville (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 620, 634 [335 
P.2d 678J; People v. Ward (1959) 50 Cal.2d 702, 711 [328 
P.2d 777, 76 A.L.R.2d 911]; People v. F1'iend (1957) 47 Cal. 
2d 749, 754 [306 P.2d 463]; People v. Ri.~er (1956) 47 Cal.2d 
566, 582 [305 P.2d 1]; People v. Cr('el! (1956) 47 Col.2d 209, 
216 [302 P.2d 307]; People v. Reese (1956) 47 Cal.2d 112, 
116 [301 P.2d 582]; People v. Byrd (1954) 42 Ca1.2d 200, 
206 [266 P.2d 505]; Peo1Jle v. Barelay (1953) 40 Ca1.2d 146, 
158 [252 P.2d 321J; l'eople v. Osborn (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 380, 
384 [231 P.2d 850]; cf. People v. Caelano (1047) 29 Ca1.2d 
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Criminal Law; § 1011.1; [7 J Crim-
inal Law, § 10tiT; [8J Criminal Law, § 619(2); [9J Homicide, 
§ 198; [10] lI11ullcidl'/ § 1S5; [11] Homicide, § 192; [12J Cl'iluinnl 
Law, § 709. 
) 
) 
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616 [177 P.!!d 1]; Pcople v. Lal'ane (1931) 212 Cal. 29 [291 
P. 561].) 
[2] Id.-Punishment-Proccdure for Determining Penalty-In-
structions.-Thc original purpose in pl.'rmitting the court, on 
the penalty pha:;c of a capital case, to instruct thc jury that, 
if it found for life imprisonlllent ratiwr than the death pcnalty, 
defendant could possihly be paroled, "'fiS to affl)rd it the perti-
nent facts to assist it in as;;cssing the significance of a life 
sentencc. 
[3] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Func-
tion of Jury.-On the penalty phase of a capital case, the 
jury's function is to consider the facts surrounding the crime 
and defendant's background and, on that b:1sis, rcach its de-
eision. The jury should not bc invited to decide if dcfendant 
will be fit for release in the future; it should not at all be in-
volvcd in the issue of the time, if any, when defendant should 
be released; it should not be propelll'd into w(>ig-hing the possi-
ble consequences of the Adult Authority's administrative ac-
tion. 
[41 Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty-Func-
tion of Jury.-On the penalty phase of a capital cnse, the jury 
is entitled to weigh psychiatric and other testimony as to de-
fendant's susceptibility to rehabilitation and reformation, but 
it should not attempt to appraise whether at some future date 
the Adult Authority may improperly release defendant or 
speculate as to whcn he might be released. 
[5] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty-In-
structions.-To avoid the necessity of refusing to answer. 
jurors' questions relating to the effect of parole laws on a term . 
of life imprisonment and to prevent latent misconceptions, 
the trial court, at the time of rendition of all instructions dur-
ing the pl'nalty phase of a capital case, should inform the jury 
in general terms that life imprisonmcnt can result in parole· 
but that such matters are of no concern to it. 
[6a, 6b] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty-
Instructions.-On the penalty phase of a first dcgree murder 
case, it was reversible error to instruct that the trial jlld;::-e 
has thc power to reduce a death penalty to a sentencc of life 
imprisonment and that the jury could consider thc possihility 
that the Governor could so reduce the sentence; such an in-
struction tends to diminish tlle jury's sense of ohli~ntion and 
to mislead the jury into assuming that r(>ndition of the penalty 
initiates a chain of proceedings by thc court and the Gon'l'nor 
that will achieve a rewcighing of the s(>ntencc and pI)H~ihl~' 
produce its nulliticA.tion. (Disapproving cnses listed in hl'allnotc 
[1] to thc ('xtent they pcrmit instrudion or ar~ulllellt that thc 
court or Go\-ernor lllay reduce a death sentence to life im-
prisonmell t.) 
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[7] Id.-Appeal-Reserving Questions-Instructions.-Defendant's 
failure to object on the penalty phase of a first degree 
murder case to an instruction telling the jury that they could 
consider the possible grant of a parole to defendant by the 
Adult Authority if defendant were given a life sentence, the 
trial judge's power to reduce a death sentence to one of life 
imprisonment, and the possibility that the Governor might 
so reduce a death penalty did not foreclose defendant's oppor-
tunity to present objections to such an instruction on appeal 
where, under the existing rulings relating to the subject mat-
ter of the instruction, such an objection at the trial level wouln 
have been useless and unavailing. 
[8] Id.-Conduct of Counsel-Concluding Arguments-Inferences 
and Deductions.-Where pefendunt made conflicting state-
ments regarding his use of drugs or narcotics at the time the 
crimes were committed, it was not misconduct for the prosecu-
tor in his concluding argument to draw an inference frolll the 
evidence that defendant falsely stated that during the week-
end of the crimes he had used dangerous drugs; such infer-
ences, limited to the evidence adduced at trial, constitute prop-
er argument. 
[9] Homicide-Instructions-Intoxication.-In a first degree mur-
der case, a refusal to instruct that expert evidence of uncon-
sciousness resulting from voluntary intoxication is received, 
not as a complete defense negating capacity to commit any 
crime, but as a partial defense negating specific mental state 
essential to a particular crime was not error where defendant 
failed to adduce expert evidence of unconsciousness reSUlting 
from voluntary intoxication, and, in fact, the expert witness' 
opinion, implemented by other testimony as to defendant's 
relevant behavior, defeated any possible inference of defend-
ant's voluntary intoxication to the point of unconsciousness. 
[10] Id.-Instructions-Lying in Wait.-An instruction that all 
murder which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait is 
murder in the first degree was justified by evidence of defend-
ant's intention to kill and of his perpetration of his mother's 
murder by means of waiting in the dark of a bedroom corridor 
for the opportune moment to strike. 
[l1a, 11b] Id.-Instructions-Reasonable Doubt of Degree.-In a 
homicide prosecution in which defendant addressed his argu-
ment principally to the question of first or second degree mur-
der, it was not error for the court to fail, on its own motion, 
to point the instructions concerning reasonable doubt and cir-
[8] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Trial, § 431; Am.Jur., Trial, (1st I'd § 485). 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Lnw, §§ 73-76; Homicide, §§ 101, 
102; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st ed § 550). 
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cumstnntial evidence specifically to the issue of degree, rather 
than defendant's right to acquittal where tlefelluant's not guil-
ty plea n'nll\ined before the court and all matter in contro-
versy under that plea continued as live issues before the jury, 
and "'here the general instructions ns to cit'cuillstantial 
evidence and reasonable doubt were implemented by an instruc-
tion apprising the jury that it should consider not merely the 
issue of first degree murder or acquittal but that, in determin-
ing the degree of the crime, it should give defendant the bene-
fit of any doubt. 
[12] Oriminal Law-Instructions-Necessity for Request.-In 
criminal cases, the court must instruct tlie jury on its own 
Inotion as to applicnble genernl legal principles, even though 
parties fail to propose such instructions, but the court need not 
render particular instructions as to specific points unless the 
parties request them or they are essential to a fair trial. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of San i 
Diego County. Ronald A, Abernethy, Judge. Affirmed in 
part and reyerseu in part. 
Proseeution for murder. Judgment of eonviction impos-
ing the death penalty reversed insofar as it relates to the 
penalty and otherwise affirmed. 
William B. Enright, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, and Harelson, Enright, Von Kalinowski & Levitt for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, \Villiam E. James, As-
sistant Attorney General, and .Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy At-
torney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TOBRINER, J.-T1lis case involves an automatic appeal 
under Penal Code section 1239, subdivision (b), following 
veruiets finding defendant guilty of two counts of murder in 
the first degree and imposing the death pcnalty. 
The three separate counts of the indictment charged de-
fendant with the murder of his mother and sister and with 
assault upon the person of one Ellen Young. To these counts 
defendant entered a plea of 110t guilty and 110t guilty by 
reason of insanity. Finding defendant both guilty anu sane, 
the jury imposed the death penalty fur caeh of the murders. 
The trial eOUl't thereafter denied defendant's motiolls for a 
new trial and for reduction of penalty. 
Defendant, a young man of 18V:: years, became involved, 
prior to the 1IlIlrdC'rs, ill all incident with a Miss Young. He 
Jail. 1964] PEOPLE v. MORSE 
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first CIH'Olllltf'rf'd her on a bus when, ill the early hours of a 
Sunday morning, he was returning to his home. She alighted 
from the bus, aud defendant follo\H'd her. After she had 
walked several blocks, defendant accosted hcr, taking her 
purse and beating ll('r about the head and shnnlclcrs. 'When 
Miss Young screamed, defendant returned the purse and 
apologized, but continued to molest her until she took refuge 
with the occupants of a nearby dwelling. 
Defendant then went to his home, where he lived with his 
mother and a 12-year-old sister who suffered from cystic 
fibrosis. Some\yhere outside the house he picked up a rock, 
concealing it under his shirt. His mother let him into the 
house. When his mother returned to her bedroom he called to 
her on some pretext, anticipating that she would get out of 
bed and come to the bedroom door. 'When she opened the 
bedroom door he was waiting in the hall; he hit her with the 
rock and killed her. The struggle awoke his sister and she 
started "yelling or something"; he struck her; later he St'-
cured a baseball bat from the kitchen closet and beat her 
until she was quiet. 
When defendant related this episode to the police, he said 
he had felt the urge to kill or "snuff" someone, a reeurrellt 
urge with him. That night he had intended to kill his mother 
as well as the girl on the bus. The identity of his victim was 
of no consequence. 
Aftcr the commission of the crimes, defendant roamed thc 
city in the family car in search of companionship, but hc 
found none. He considered and rejected suicide; he thought, 
too, of the possibility of successfully disposing of the bodies 
and decided that it would be futile. He did not sleep at all that 
night but finally about 4 or 5 p.m. on Sunday he visited the 
home of his sister-in-law, Gail :1\1orse, and her mother, :1\1rs. 
Keating, whom hc informed that he had found his mother 
and sister dead. Mrs. Keating sought the assistance of a 
neighbor who was a police officer; he callcd other officers to 
meet him, and they escorted defendant back to investigate 
thc crimc scene. The officers found the bodies and the murder 
weapons, the rock and a baseball bat, on the premises just ag 
defendant had left them. 
Defendant remained phlegmatic until one of the police offi-
cers in the car transporting him to headquarters mentioned 
that he would give defendant a pencil and paper so t]lat he 
might make notes to refresh his memory. Defendant re-
sponded; "I don't think that will do me any good, and 
) 
J 
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prison won't help me. It must be something in my head." 
When the officer asked whether that meant dcfendant had 
committed the murders, defendant said "Yes." At the 
police station defendant voluntarily responded to interroga-
tion: the officers tape-recorded his confession; the prosecu-
tion played the tape-recording at the trial and thereafter an 
officer read a transcript of its contents to the jury. 
At the trial defendant recanted some of the statements h~ 
had made in his confession. He asserted that he had procured 
narcotic drugs in Tijuana the Saturday preceding the killing 
and, contrary to his earlier denial, stated that during all of 
that eyening and the next day he had remained under the 
influence of benzedrine and barbiturates. He denied that he 
felt an urge to kill but stated that he was "bombed out" 
from the effects of the drugs. He claimed that he kept this 
fact from the police because at the time of his confession he 
was so shaken that he wanted to die. Defendant further testi-
fied, in substance, that the crimes were not premeditated. He 
said that he intended merely to steal Ellen Young's purse. 
He was induced to strike his mother by her accusations when 
he tripped over the doorsill that "You are going back to jail 
because you are messing around with dope again." He 
struck his sister to silence her screams. 
\Ve consider, first, the penalty phase of the trial and ex-
plain why we have concluded that the rendition of certain 
instructions, the introduction of certain evidence, and the 
presentation of certain argument~ ,vorked prejudicial error. 
We then examine the guilt phase of the trial and briefly 
point out that defendant's four assertions of error lack 
merit. 
A. rhe penalty trial. 
[Ia] The trial court instructed the jury that "Every per-
son guilty of first degree murder shall suffer death or con-
finement in the State Prison for life in the sole discretion of 
the jury .... In making your determination as to the penalty 
to be imposed, you may, in exereising your discretion to 
choose between different punishments, consider as a possible 
consequence that the law of this State provides that a de-
fendant sentenced either to death or life imprisolllnent may 
be pardoned or haye his sentenee reduced by the Governor 
and that if this defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment 
he may be eligible for parole at the expiration of seven calen-
dar years. A trial judge may also reduce the penalty from 
death to life imprisonment." (CALJIC No. 306 (rev.).) 
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Statistical eYi(lellce of the median and average time served 
by defelldants cOIlvicted of first degree murder and of the 
legal minimulll period of incarceration was presented to the 
jury by means of a stipulation.1 
The qnott'll instruction illustrates the last and most ex-
treme sta~e in a progression of instructions in the penalty 
phase of capital eases. Our present concern as to the impact 
of the instruction compels us to review our past rulings on 
this suhj('et and to make certain that the court's statements 
to the jury in its tragic task do not confuse but clarify its 
undrrtaking. [2] Our original purpose in permitting the 
court to instrl1('t the jury that, if it found for life imprison-
ment rathl'r t.han the death penalty, the defendant could pos-
sibly bc paroled,2 was to afford it the pertinent facts "to 
assist it in assessing the significance of a life sentence" 
1" :Mr. Stahl and I are in agreement that if Mr. Joseph Spangler of 
the Bureau of Criminal Statistics in Sacramento, California, were called 
to the witness stand he would testify that studies made in the previous 
three year periods concerning people convicted of first degree murder 
would be as follows: In the year 1959 tht:re were thirty-two cases of 
persons paroled. Median time served was 136.5 months; average time 
served was 144.3 months. In the year 1960 there were sixteen cases of 
parole. The median time served was 139 months, the average time served 
164 months. In the year 1961 there were twenty-two cases of parole. 'fhe 
median time served was 141 months; average time 152 months. These 
are figures for male prisoners for time served before first parole. The 
absolute legal minimum for both sexes, men and women, before eligibil· 
ity for parole is seven calendar years." As Justice Peters points out in 
People v. Purvis (1963) ante, pp. 323, 353 [33 CaI.Rptr. 104, 384 P.2d 
424J, these statistics fail to include "the basic facts involved"; they 
raise a serious question of reliability in omitting "the time being served 
by those stilI confined under a life sentence and not released." 
2People v. Hamilton (1963) ante, pp. 105, 135 [32 CaI.Rph·. 4, 383 
P.2d 412]; People v. Purvis (1963) ante, pp. 323, 350 [33 CuI.Uptr. 
104, 384 P.2d 424]; People v. Jackson (1963) 59 CaI.2d 375, 378 [2!l 
Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 ?2d 937]; People v. Ketchel (1963) 59, CaI.2d ;,03, 
543 [30 CaI.Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394]; People v. Modesto (1963) 59 
Cal.2d 722, 735 [31 CaI.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]; People v. Gainc .• 
(1962) 58 Ca1.2d 630, 637 [25 Cal.Rptr. 448, 375 P.2d 296]; People v. 
Love (1061) 56 CaI.2d 720, 726 [16 CaI.Rptr. 777, 17 CaI.Rptr. 481, 366 
P.2d 33, 800]; People v. Purvis (1961) 56 Cal.2d 93, 96 [13 CaI.Rptr. 
SOl, 362 P.2d il3) ; People \'. Robi/la)'d (lD60) 55 Cal.2d 8g, 102 [10 Cal. 
Rptr. 167, 3,,8 P.2d 29;,]; People ,'. Scott (1060) ;;3 CaI.2d inS, ;;66 [2 
CaI.Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d 882 J; Pl'ople v. Chc$$man (l9:;() :;2 CaI.2d 467, 
49ii [341 P.:!<l 679]; People v. Purvis (19i\9) 52 Ca1.2d 871, 884 [346 
P.2«l 22}; ['eol'ic v. Turville (l!l,,9) ;:;1 Cal.2d 620, 634 [335 P.2<l 6i8}; 
l'e0l'{e v. JVarrl (l9,j!l) iiO CaI.2d 70:!, 711 [328 P.2d 77i, 76 A.L.R.:!d 
!IlJ I, Prol,le \'. Friend (Ill.i7) 47 Ca1.2d H!l, 7.,4 [306 P.2d 4G3]; 
reopie v. Riser (l!).jr,) 47 Ca1.2«l .i!;ti, :;>\2 [31)5 P.2d 1] ; People v_ 
. J 
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(People v. Purvis (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 8il, 885 [346 P.2l1 22] ).3 
Although such information may haY(~ beell l'l'lc\"allt. the in-
struction, abetted by the introductioll of eddl'lIl'(' as til the 
possibility of parole, lIas brought about untoward consequen-
ces to defendants. It has brought in its wuke a tn'llll of 
unremitting expansion in the scope of argument and evidence 
presented to the jury that has coincidentally product'd and 
augurs future confusion. 
The very introduction of the fact that a prisoner senteneec} 
to life imprisonment became eligible to parole after seven 
years inevitably led to ramifieatiolls. Confrontc·d with this 
bare instruction, defense counsel first countcred by adducing 
evidence that the a\'crage and median sentcnces of d"feud-
ants se!ltenced to life terms actually ran longer than tlte 
minimum of seven years.4 This evidence, in substance, may 
have induced some juries to weigh the alternative of a sen-
tence of a particular number of years, rathcr than a life 
sentence, against the death penalty. In any event, the fear 
that such was the case induced defense counsel to attl'mpt to 
reassure the jury that the Adult Authority propcrly per-
formed its task of deciding whether a defendant should be 
paroled, and if so, when he should be granted parole. Thus 
defense counsel developed the practice of calling offieials 
from the Adult Authority as witnesses to testify to the qunli-
fi<'ations and bacl.ground of its membt'rsltip, the procedures: 
and considerations involved in granting paroles, and the sta-
tist.ical showing of recidh'ism of prisoners released on parole. 
The reaction by prosecuting attorneys to these develop-
ments took the form of an attempt to emphasize to the jury 
the possibility of error by the Adult Authority and the po-
tential grie\'ous harm that might result from the illad\'crtent 
Green (1956) 47 CaJ.2d 209, 216 [302 P.2d 30iJ ; People v. Reese 
(l!).j6) 47 CaJ.2d 112, 116 [301 P.2d 582J; People v. Byrd (1954) 42 
Cal.2d 200, 206 [266 P.2d 505]; People v. Barclay (19i)3) 40 Cal.2d 
146, Vi8 [2;)2 P.2d 321); People \'. Osool"n (IV51) 37 Cal.2tl 380, 384 
r231 P.2d 8iiO] ; d. People "1'. Caetano (1947) 29 Ca1.2d 616 [177 P.2d 
1]; People v. LaVerne (1931) 212 Cal. 20 [297 P. 561]. 
aWe set forth typical expressions of the cases: " ... [T]he Court may 
instruct the jury as to the consequences of the different penalties that 
may be imposed 80 that an intelligent decision may be made." People v. 
Barclay (l9ii3) 40 Cal.2d 146, 1ii8 [2ii2 P.2d 321]. "The quoted rules 
are pertinent as matters of fact to be considered in determining the 
pennlty ••.. " People v. Friend (19ii7) 47 Ca1.2d 749, 755 [306 P.2d 
463]. 
4E.g., People v. Byrd (1954) 42 Cal.2d 200 [260 P.2d 505]; PeopZe v. 
Barclay (1953) 40 Cal.2d 146 [2ii2 P.2d 321J • 
) 
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parol(\ of a defcndant convicted of murder. Thus tIle appar-
ently innocuous stt'p of giving instructions of the operation 
of thc parole laws has resulted in the jury's attempted eval-
uation of the competency of the Adult Authority to admin-
ister the parole system. The jury sometimes lamentably has 
"tl'it'u" the Adult Authority (People v. Purvi.s (1963) ante, 
pp. 323, 332 [33 Cal.Rptr. 104, 384 P.2d 424]). 
Concomitantly with permitting instructions as to the pa-
role laws, this court accepted the procedure of informing the 
jury tl1at thc Governor could exercise the power, among other 
things, of reducing a death penalty to life imprisonment.1i 
Thc trend in this direction, which, as we shall develop more 
fully infra, may well tend to reduce the jury's sense of. re-
sponsibility, was l1alted momentarily in People v. Linden 
(1959) 52 Ca1.2d 1 [338 P.2d 397]. Linden held it improper 
to inform the jury about automatic appeals in death penalty 
cases. The pres:mt case, however, indicates that the thrust of 
expansion has fully resumed. Here the jury has been in-
formed as to the trial judge's power to reduce a death penal-
ty to life imprisonment. 
In the recent case of People v. Purvis (1963) ante, pp. 
323,352 [33 Cal.Rptr. 104,384 P.2d 424], we expressed serious 
doubt as to the reliability of statistics to show the probabili-
ties that a sentence of life imprisonment will result in parole 
or to indicate the time when the Adult Authority will, if at 
all, grant parole. Thus far we have not been confronted with 
a case in which statistics and evidence have been introduced 
to show the probabilities of the trial judge's reduction of a 
death sentence or of the Governor's exercise of his power of 
commutation. If the present trend continues such cases surely 
will arise. 
\Vhen we opened the door a slight crack to allow an in-
struction, and to admit an evidentiary showing, as to the 
realistic consequence of a sentence of life imprisonment, we 
had in mind a limited and legitimate objective. But various 
maneuvers haye pushcd the door so widely ajar that too 
many confusing elements have entered the courtroom. The 
ISPeople v. Chessman (1059) 52 Ca1.~ci 467, 495 [341 P.2d 670]; 
People v. Turville (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 620, 63! [335 P.2d 678]; Pcople v. 
Ward (19;;8) 50 CII.1.2d 702, 711 [3~8 P.2ci 777, 76 A.L.R.2d 911]; 
People v. Friend (I05i) 47 Ca1.2d 749, 7,,4 [306 P.2d 463]; People v. 
Biscr (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 566, 582 [305 P.2d 1]; People v. Byrd (1054) 
42 Ca1.2d 200,207 [266 P.2d 505]. 
) 
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time has arrived for specifying the matters that the jury 
SllOUld consider. 
Before turning to a specific analysis of the ca.'1e as it is now 
presented to us, we note the current posture of the decisions. 
As to the issue of presenting to the jury the possibilities of 
parole, California now stands in a striking minority position 
among other jurisdictions,' although our earlier cases ap-
peared more in accord with the majority. '1 With regard to 
instructing the jury as to the trial judge's power to reduce 
sentence, prior decisions of this court, as we shall later ex-
'Lawley v. State (1956) 264 Ala. 283 [87 So.2d 433); Scarber v. 
State (1956) 226 Ark. 503 [291 S.W.2d 241]; Sukle v. People (1941) 
107 Colo. 269 [111 P.2d 233); Broyles v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1954) 
267 S.W.2d 73 [47 A.L.R.2d 1252]; State v. Hefl,ry (1940) 196 La. 217 
[198 So. 910); State v. White (1958) 27 N.J. 158 [142 A.2d 65]; Bea" 
v. State (1936) 58 Okla.Crim. 432 [54 P.2d 675]; Graham v. State 
(1957) 202 Tenn. 423 [304 S.W.2d 622J [prosecutor's argument); Wil· 
liams v. State (1950) 191 Tenn. 4.')6 [234 S.W.2d 993) [trial court's 
instruction) ; Coward v. Commo"IL"l'alth (193;:;) 164 Va. 639 [178 S.E. 
797]. See Lovely v. United States (4th Cir. 1948) 169 F.2d 386; WilBoft, 
v. State (1956) 212 Ga. 157 [91 S.E.2d 16]; Farrell v. People (1890) 
133 Ill. 244 [24 N.E. 423]; State v. Junkins (1910) 147 Iowa 588 [126 
N.W. 689]; Jacobs v. State (1913) 103 Miss. 622 [60 So. 723]; State v. 
Quilling (1953) 363 1\10. 1016 [2;:;6 S.W.2d 751); Grandsinger v. State 
(1955) 161 Neb. 419 [73 N.W.2d 632]; State v. Conner (1955) 241 N.C. 
468 [85 S.E.2d 584]; Liska v. State (1926) 115 Ohio St. 283 [152 N.E. 
667]; State v. Thorne (1912) 41 L'tllh 414 r126 P. 286, Ann.Cas. 1915D 
90]; Jones v. Commonu'ealth (1952) 194 Va. 273 [72 S.E.2d 693, 35 
A.L.R.2d 761); State v. Carroll (193;) 52 Wyo. 29 [69 P.2d 542]; cf. 
Deming v. State (1956) 235 Ind. 282 [133 N.E.2d 51]; Commonwealth 
v. Johnson (1951) 368 Pa. 139 [81 A.2d 569]. Contra, Sullit'an v. State 
(1936) 47 Ariz. 224 [55 P.2d 312); State v. Buttry (1939) 199 Wash. 
228 [90 P.2d 1026); State v. Shau'cn (1894) 40 W.Va. 1 [20 S.E. 873]. 
See also Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion 111 Capital Cases (1953) 
101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1099, 1118; Comment (19:.i4) 54 Colum.L.Rev. 946,956· 
951'; Comment (1953) 39 Va.L.Rev. 85; Comment (1953) 10 Wash. '" 
Lee L.Rev. 29; NotA 35 A.L.R.2d 769. 
'1The case of first impression in California apparently was People v. 
Reilly (1929) 208 Cal. 385 [281 P. 606) in which this court did not 
indicate particular favor towards the present position. The prosecutor 
had argued to the effect that it was a matter of common knowledge that 
a sentence of life imprisonment means that a defendant will serve from 
seven to ten years and then be "turned out" on society. This court 
stated" [I]t is unfortllnate that such overzealous argument sometimes 
occurs in the course of a criminal trial, but no objection was made 
thereto nor was any r~qucst made that the jury should be admonished to 
disregard this statement, and, in view of the entire record in this case, 
we cannot say that a different result would have follo\ved had this 
statement been omittcd." (208 Cal. at p. 387; italics added.) Seo 
People v' LaVerne (1931) 212 Cal. 29 [297 P. 561). 
In People v. Letourn~au (1949) 34 Cal.2d 4i8 [211 P.2d 865), the 
) 
) 
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plain in more drtail, indicat.e that such instl"Uetion consti-
tutes error in that it tends to reduce thc jury's sense of 
responsibility in imposing thc death penalty. 
\Ye turn to an analysis of these two basic aspects of the 
problem: the instruction, evidence and argument as to the 
role of the Adult Authority, and the instruction as to the 
roles of the trial judge and the Governor. 
jury, nfter a period of deliberation, inquired in writing of the trial 
court: " 'Does the imposition of "imprisonment in the State prison for 
the term of his natural life" allow of later pardon or parole and 
possible release? I The trial judge stnted, 'that is something that is a 
matter for the Court. It is not, in the processes of law, a matter for 
:rour consideration •.• and we will not answer it.' " This court stated: 
"This reply was in part correct; tile possibility of pardon or parole teal! 
not for the jUr)"s consideration. '" It does not appear that defendant 
could hm'e bc('n prejudiced by the fact that the trial judge, in a strictly 
technienl scnse, erroneously stated that the questions were 'for the I 
Court' wherens the question of pardon is (at least Ultimately) for the! 
Governor ••. nnd the question of parole is for the Adult Authority, the 
power of whieh is defined by the Legislature ..•• " (34 Ca1.2d at pp. 493· 
494; Italics ndded.) Unlike the more recer.t cases cited supra, Letour· l 
neau expressell no distinction between the issues of guilt and penalty as 
to tbe propriety of the jury considering parole. The court concluded 
with the statement: "But we must presume that the jury followed the 
instruetion which for~ade its being influenced by conjecture or public 
feeling, and accepted the judge's statement that is was not to eonsider 
the possibility of pardon or parole. (See People -. Ferlin (1928) 203 
Cal. 587, 600 [265 P. 230]; People v. Anderson (1932) 120 Cal.App. 5, 
8 [7 P.2d 202].)" (34 Cal.2d at p. 494.) The court thus approves of 
the prior decisions prohibiting the jury's consideration of the possibility 
of pardon or parole. 
In People v. IIoyt (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 306, 311 [125 P.2d 2()], the jury 
inquired if a life imprisonment meant possible parole. The trial court 
answered" You hayc nothing to do with that." A juror then asked for 
"a definition of life imprisonment. " The trial court answered "All I 
can tell you it is impri~onmcllt in the penitentiary for the period of 
natural life. Wllat is done later by the aut1iorities is nOM of our 
concern." t;pholdillg the propriety of the trial court's remarks, this 
eOllrt noted that such statements could not be construed as suggesting to 
the jury that life imprisonment mennt parole in a manner that caused 
the jury improperly to impose the death penalty. In People v. Ramo8 
(1935) 3 Cal.2d 269 [44 P.2d 301], the jury inquired for information 
"in regard to the penalty if a man is given life imprisonment." (P. 
272.) The dcfcndant did not object, and the eourt gave information 
describing the parolc system. This court pointcd out, "The action of the 
eourt was an irregularity that has been many times condemned by this 
eourt." (P. 273.) While the court did not reverse, it stated that the 
instruction to the jury should hllve 'I stopped" aft!'r telling them that 
first degree murder entitles the jury to choose between the sentences of 
life imprisonment or death. See People v. Ba1llirC6 (1934) 1 Ca1.2d 559, 
564·565 (36 P.2d 628]. 
) 
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1. Instruction, evidcllce and argumcnt as to Adult Author-
ity's possible grant of parole. 
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[lb] Although the Legislature has, through the Adult 
Authority, sought to provide for the rehabilitation of erim-
inal defendants, it has coincidentally retained the death pen-
alty and left its administration to the unguided discretion of 
the jury. In the general field of criminal law the Legislature 
has abandoned the ancient notion of categorical punishment, 
the infliction of fixed terms for certain crimes, and substi-
tuted the indeterminate sentence, leaving to the Adult 
Authority the judgment of the period of incarceration.s The 
Authority does not fix that period pursuant to a formula of 
punishment,9 but in accordance with the adjustment and 
BAs Justice Schauer has pointed out in People v. Friend (1957) 47 
Ca1.2d 749, 763 (fn. 7) [306 P.2d 463]: " ... This state has long siuce ; 
accepted the view (as recognized lind implemented by the indeterminate 
sentence laws and other acts) that, generally speaking, punishment 
should be fitted to the perpetrator of the crime, not merely the crime • 
• •. " The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. State of New York 
(1949) 337 U.S. 241, 24i et seq. [69 S.Ct. 107£1, 93 L.Ed. 1337] has 
recognized the validity of the same principle: "Undoubtedly the New 
York statutes emphasize a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that 
the punishment should fit the offender lind not merely the crime. People 
v. Johnson, 252 N.Y. 38i, 3v2 [169 ~.E. 619, 6211. The belief no longer 
prevails that every offense in a like legal clItegory call for an identical 
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular 
offender. This whole country has traveled far from the period in which 
the death sentence was nn automatic and commonplace result of com·ic· 
tions-even for offenses tollay dc·cmed trivial. ••. Retribution is no 
longer the dominant objecth·e of the criminal law. Reformation and 
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal 
jurisprudence." See Roberts v. Duffy (1014) 167 Cal. 629, 634 (140 P. 
260); People v. Denne (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 409 (297 P.2d 451]; but 
see Pen. Code, § 209. 
9Section 5079 of the Penal Code states that the director of corrections 
shall pro\·ide for a psychiatric and diagnostic clinic and that" The work 
of the clinic shall include a scientific stuJy of each prisoner, his career 
and life history, the cause of his criminal acts alld recommendations for 
his care, training anll employment with a view to his reformation an,l to 
the protection of society .... " Indeed, the early case of Roberts v. 
Duffy (1914) 167 Cal. 6::!9, 634 [140 P. 260J explains that the" purpose 
and object of a parole system is to mitigate the rigor of the olel, and 
while requiring the punishment of a prisoner by actual confinement for a 
fixed period of his term of sentence, still to provide a more humane 
management and prison discipline under which there is extended to those 
who may show a disposition to reform and whose reformation may 
reasonably be ex pee ted, a hope and prospect of liberation from the 
prison walls under the restrictions and conllitions of II parole. It recog· 
nill's, that notwithstanding the commission of crime requires a. measure 
of imprisonment as a penalty, still that the interests of society require 
) 
) 
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social rehabilitation of the individual analyzed as a human 
composite of intellectual, emotional and genetic factors. 
Hence the jury, in this whole field of crime, docs not deter-
mine the penalty; the task of deciding the term of incarcera-
tion lies with an expert body. Yet in the instance of capital 
crime the jury must perform the fUIlction of defining punish-
ment, which, in this casc, includes the tremendous sanction of 
the death penalty. 
The jury's task assumes formidable proportions because it 
far transcends the usual function of finding whether or not 
certain eyents occurred and certain consequellces resulted 
from them. The jury in this instance performs no such cir-
cumscribed taRk; it must in each particular case, depending 
wholly on the kind of defendant and nature of facts before 
it, decide the issue of life or death. In reaching its crucial 
decision, although Penal Code section 190.1 states it may 
consider "facts in aggravation or mitigation of the pen-
alty, " the jury has no guidelines, no standards, no criteria. 
The Legislature has reposed in the jury a wide and onerous 
task, aggraYated by this conflict in function and philosophic 
background. (People v. Ham·ilton (1963) ante, pp. 105, 136 
[32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412].) 
The objectiYe situation is difficult enough without blurring 
the functions. [3] The function of the jury is to consider 
the facts surrounding the crime and defendan t 's back-, 
ground, and upon that basis, reach its decision. The jury. 
should not be invited to decide if the defendant will be fit for: 
release in the future; it should not at all be involved in the 
issue of the time, if any, when the defendant should be re-
leased; it should not be propellcd into weighing the possible 
consequences of the Authority's administrative action. . 
The vice of placing such issues before the jury reaches 
deeper than the promulgation of confusion; it frames ques-
tions that no human mind can answer, and it, in substance, 
transposes the task of the Adult Authority to the jury. 
The questions are unanswerable because they rest upon 
future eyents which are unpredictable. The jury's attention 
may be focused, as it was here, upon whether the Authority 
will releasc the defendal1t into society at some ullcertain <late 
in the future, such as "eight, niue, ten years from now." 
tbat under prison discipline e,"ery effort should be made to produce a 
rcl'ol'matiOIl of the I'ri~on"r. and proper lI1('astlres adoptl'u 80 that this 
D1Uy he ac('ompiisLed ..•• " 
) 
) 
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Based upon what defendant lllay then be, the jury is aslH'd 
whether it thinks defendant should at that time be l'\'leased 
to society. Premised upon the unlmown, the qucstion asks fOI' 
an answer that cannot be intellig('lltly rendered. The JUI'Y i~ 
precipitated into a judgment upon the imponderable. 
To propose such questions to the jury is to prescnt to it 
problems that the Legislature has entl'ustNl for solutiol1 to 
the Adult Authority. The IJegislature established the Author-
ity as a specialized body, aided by a trained staff. to decide 
such questions. It reaches its decisions after the prisoner has 
received treatment at a corrective institution, has bl'en care-
fully supervised and has been afforded an opportunity to 
attempt to understand llis maladjustment. From ~'NlI'S of nn-
notated observation of the defendant tIle Authority can ren-
der an informed prognosis as to his potential. The jUl'Y, on 
the other hand, must plunge into a judgm('nt bas('d upon 
conjecture; it must attempt to perform a function whir:h the 
Legislature expressly granted to another institution and im-
pliedly denied to it. 
The final and most dangerous error of permitting the jury 
to consider the Authority's possible gt'ant of parole is to ill-
duce it to pass judgment upon the very issue foreclosed to it 
and to prCL'cnt the proper body from deciding the is.<me at 
the proper time. The jury can conclude tllat the Authority 
will improperly grant defendant parole in the futurl'; it rna:\" 
fear that the Adult Authority will permit a "daugerous" 
defendant to walk the streets; it may then foredose th/! 
anthority from ever granting parole by imposing the death 
penalty. The jury would thus improperly preempt the wholH 
parole system and defeat the legislative design. The jury 
would then utilize the death penalty for fear that the Adult 
Authority will not properly perform the function that the 
Legislature has specifically delegated to it.lo 
The vices which we have described above find dramatic 
illustration in the prosecutor's argument to the jury in the 
instant case: "And I frankly believe, based on the evidence 
that we have heard here, that he is never going to change. 
Twelve years from now, or seven, eight, nine, ten years from 
lOAs one writer put it, "[T]he fact that a person sentenced for life 
might be released before he may safely be returned to society indicates 
a weakness in the parole system-not that he ought to have been ex-
cute!!." (Knowlton, Problems 01 Jury Discretion in Capita! Cases 
(1953) 101 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1099, 1119.) See 1" re Lee (1918) 177 Cal. 690, 
693 [171 P. 9;)9]. 
) 
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now, when he comes up for consideration do you honestly 
think that he is going to have changed one little bit T Do yon 
honestly feel that if he gets the thought in his mind that he 
would like to kill somebody that he hi going to be any 
different' ... It is true that when they consider him for 
parole they are going to consider the fact that he killed two 
people. No question about that. But that's llO guarantee that 
he is not going to be back on the street in the average time, 
or even less than the average time. That's what we have got 
to face. That's the reality. " 
\Ye have pointed out that the majority of other jurisdic-
tions hold that the possibility of parole is not a proper matter 
for the jury's consideration in the instant situation. \Ve turn 
to an exposition of the reasoning of some of these cases. 
The leading case on the subject demonstrates that we 
would not be the first jurisdiction to reconsider its earlier 
position on the point. In a learned opinion by Chief Justice. 
\Veintraub the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. White. 
(1958) 27 N.J. 158 [142 A.2d 65], overruled a body of settled 
law that had been reaffirmed in numerous cases during an 
interim of oyer 40 years. The court in White stated that· 
"upon a re-appraisal of the problem, we cannot escape the I 
conclusion that the course heretofore approved is errone-
ous." (P. 72 [142 A.2d].) On the merits of the issue White 
held that" [T] he Legislature committed to the jury the re-
sponsibility to determine in the first instance whether pun-
ishment should be life or death. It charged another agency 
with the responsibility of deciding how a life sentence shall 
be executed. The jurors perform their task completely when 
they decide the matter assigned to them upon the evidence 
before them. \Vhat happens thereafter is no concern of theirs. 
It is no more proper for a jury to conclude that death be the 
penalty because a life sentence may be commuted or the de-
fendant paroled, than it would be for a trial judge in other 
criminal causes deliberately to impose an excessive sentence 
to frustrate the statutory scheme committing parole to 
another agency." (142 A.2d at p. 76.) 
Broyles v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1954) 267 S.W.2d 73 [47 
A.L.R.2d 1252], involved a case in which the jury exercised 
the duty of fixing the sentence. The prosecutor argued to the 
jury that a life sentence meant the possibility of parole after 
eight years, that a 21-year sentence meant the possibility of 
parole after six years, and tllat defendant was eligible f(,l' 
parole after the expiration of one-third of any sentence of 
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less than 10 years. In holding such an argument to be preju-
dicial error, the Kentucky court stated: " [U] nder our theory 
of separation of governmental powers, it is the duty of the 
judiciary to obtain a conviction of those guilty of crime. But 
once that conviction has been obtained and sentencc imposed, 
it is the duty of other departments of government to enforce 
the sentence and to determine when and under what circum-
stances the prisoner will be eligible for release. Therefore, 
when the judiciary attempts to anticipate the rules of the 
legislative and executive departments relating to the parole 
of prisoners and attempts, in effect, to circumvent those rules 
it infringes upon the prerogatives of other departments of 
government." (267 S.W.2d at p. 76.) 
In lYilliams v. State (1950) 191 Tenn. 456 [234 S.W.2d 
993], the responsibility of choosing between the death penal-
ty and life imprisonment likewise was reposed in the jury. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court found prejudicial error in the 
trial court's discussion of parole laws with the jury; the 
court emphasized that the jury could not properly inflict the 
death penalty only because it opposed the defendant's possi-
ble parole under a life sentence. (See Graham v. State (1957) 
202 Tenn. 423 [304 S.W.2d 622].) 
The appellate court found prcjudicial error in Sukle v. 
People (1941) 107 Colo. 269 [111 P.2d 233], a case in which 
the jury, after being instructed that life imprisonment meant 
possible parole, rendered a death penalty verdict. The court 
stated that the jury was encouraged "to speculate on what 
the chicf executive of the state, at some future time, acting 
pursuant to authority of law apart from the law under which 
the judiciary proceeds, might then conclude justice required 
at his hands. Prejudicial error is obvious." (P. 235 [111 
P.2d].) 
In reversing a rape conviction which involved only impri-
sonment, and not the death penalty, as here, the court in 
Lawley v. State (1956) 264 Ala. 283 [87 So.2d 433], stated 
that" [I] n arriving at a proper sentence to be imposed on a 
defendant, the proportionate part thercof which probably or 
possibly might be deducted therefrom by the Parolc Board 
was not a proper factor to be considered by the jury, and it 
is error for the court to instruct the jury as to the laws or 
customs governing the granting of paroles. '" It is reason-
able to assume that the jury wished to punish the dcfendant 
by having him serve a certain number of years in the pcni-
tentiary and in order to insure that he serve that length of 
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time, the jury was planning to add to the length of the 
sentence in order to compensate for a parole before the entire 
sentence was served." (87 So.2d at pp. 434-435.) 
In view of these considerations we turn to the delicate 
problem of delineating the function of the jury in the penal-
ty phase of the case and determining the kind of instructioll 
that should be given to it. "We have stated that elllighteneJ 
legislation in California has advanced the treatment of crim-
inals from the stage of mechanical punishment, based exclu-
sively upon the crime, to an appraisal of the indiYidnnl 
wrongdoer for the purpose of his possible reformation. Til" 
emphasis must be upon the individual rather than th,> 
offense; such insistence upon the importance of the iudi dd-
ual symbolizes a basic value of our society that contrasts with 
a totalitarian denigration of the individual as an appeIHlag:' 
of the state. Our insistence upon the dignity and worth of 
the individual must surely be strictly and steadfastly applic,l 
in the crucial context of the individual's life or death. 
The jury decides whether the individual should be permit-
ted to live upon the basis of a complete and careful analysis 
of that person as a human composite of emotional, psycholog-
ical and genetic factors. The jury looks at the individual as a 
whole being and determines if he is fit to live. [4] The jury 
is entitled to weigh psychiatric and other testimony as to his 
susceptibility to rehabilitation and reformation. It should 
not, however, attempt to appraise whether at some future 
date the Adult Authority may improperly release the defend-
ant or speculate as to when he might be released. 
[5] In evolving a proper instruction for the jury, we rec-
ognize that individual jurors often entertain some ideas of 
parole laws and might erroneously consider the effect of such 
laws upon a term of life imprisonment. They may ask the 
trial judge for information upon the subject; it is not enough 
for the trial court merely to refuse the request and relegate 
them to ignorance. To avoid such unanswered queries and to 
prevent latent misconceptions, we believe the trial court, at 
the time of rendition of all instructions, should inform the 
jury in general terms that life imprisonment can result in 
parole but that such matters are of no concern to it.ll 
llMany of the jurisdictions that hold it improper for a jury to 
consider the possibility of parole in deciding punishment do not finrl 
error in instructions or arguments relating to parole so long as the trial 
court specifies that this subject is not a mntter for consideration or 
speculation by the jury. E .. g., Lee v. State (19,)7) 265 Ala. 623 [93 
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Vote set forth the following instruction for the general guid. 
ance of the trial court: "A sentence of life imprisonment 
means that the prisoner may be paroled at some time durillg 
his lifetime or that he may spend the remainder of his 
natural life in prison. An agency known as the Adult Au· 
thority is empowered by statute to determine if and when a 
prisoner is to be paroled, and under the statute no prisoner 
can be paroled unless the Adult Authority is of the opinion 
that the prisoner when released will assume a proper place in 
society and that his release is not contrary to thc welfare of 
Rociety. A prisoner released on parole may remain on parole 
for the balance of his life and if he violates the terms of the 
parole he may be returned to prison to serve the life sentence. 
"So that you willl1ave no misunderstandings relating to a 
sentence of life impri!'lonment, you have been informed as to 
the general scheme of our parole system. You are now in. 
structed, however, tl1at the matter of parole is not to be con· 
sidered by you in determining the punishment for this de· 
fendant, and you may 110t speculate as to if, or when, parole 
would or would not be granted to him. It is not your func-
tion to decide now whether this man will be suitable for 
parole at some future date. So far as you are concerned, you 
are to decide only whether this man shall suffer the death 
penalty or whether he shall be permitted to remain alive. If 
upon consideration of the evidence you believe that life im-
prisonment is the proper sentence, you must assume that 
those officials charged with the operation of our parole 
Rystem will perform their duty in a correct and responsible 
manner, and that they will nut parole this defendant unless 
he can be safely released into society. It would be a violation 
of your duty as jurors if you were to fix the penalty at death 
because of a doubt that the Adult Authority will properly 
carry out its responsibilities. " 
[Ie] In the light of the foregoing discussion we disap· 
So.2d 757] ; State v. Conner (1955) 241 N.C. 468 [85 S.E.2d 584]; 
State v. Whitll (1958) 27 N.J. 158 [142 A.2d 65]; Li8ka v. Statll 
(1926) 115 Ohio St. 283 [1'i2 N.E. 6oil. In State v. White, supra, the 
court set torth a proposed model instruction similar to that ineorporated 
in this opinion. Some jurisdictions hold it improper even to mention or 
discuss the parole laws. lllcKuhen v. State (1960) 102 Ga.App. 75 [IVi 
S.E.2d 625]; sce Williams v. State (1950) 191 Tenn. 456 [234 S.W.2d 
993]; ct. People v. Burgard (1941) 377 Ill. 322 [36 N.E.2d 558); Davis 
v. State (1959) 168 Tex. Crim Rep. 72 [328 S.W.2d 76,3.1 See generally, 
Comment (1936) 15 Stan.L.Re\'. 349; Comment (19:)3) 10 Wash. & Lee 
L.Rev.219. 
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prove of CAIJJIC No. 306 (rev.) and the dcei~ions set forth 
in footnote 2, supra, to the extent that they conflict with this 
opinion. 
2. Instruction as to the trial judge's and Gfwernnr's possi-
ble reduction of the death penalty. 
[6a] We believe that the instruction that the trial judge I 
has the power to reduce a death penalty to a sentence of lif~ I 
imprisonment may very well induce the jury to assume that 
its finding for the death penalty merely initiates a series of 
procedures which invoke a reconsideration of the penalty and 
which may result in its reduction to life imprisonment. 
Since the jury undertakes the task of assessing the penalty 
in the wide latitude of absolute discretion and in the absence 
of statutory guide lines, the suggestion that big-her authori-
ties will review its decision must profoundly nlIct·t it. Up'liI 
the delicate scale of unbounded determination we add a lie\\' 
but definite weight. The impact of the instruction must Ih'\·· 
essarily weaken the jury's own sense of respollsibilit~·. Yet 
nothing should be introduced to the jury to detract from it~ 
most careful consideration of the choice of penalty. 'l'hat 
effort should not be adulterated by the illfusioll of foreign 
and deflecting factors. 
In previous cases we have condemned the introdu('tinn of 
considerations of less consequence than iustructiolls which 
have brought to the jury's attention a postst'ntendllg po:,si-
bility that might diminish its sensitivity to its task. In Peo-
ple v. Linden (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 1 [~38 P.2d 8!l7J, we found 
error in the prosecutor's argument that, •. in California w'! 
have a law that where a death penalty is imposed ... it. 
goes immediately to the Supreme Court of t.he State of Cali-
fornia. They review your decisioll if a tll'nth penalty is im· 
posed, and they determine from the law w1l('thor such a 
penalty is justified, or if they believe the eddence is such that 
only a second-degree murdt'r ,\'as conll11ittl'd, or they could de-
termine tl1at there was prej llrlieial error. " (32 Cal.2d at p. 26.) 
In condemning this type of argument, Lil/dclI stated that "a 
jury should approach the tasks of fillding facts and eX(>l'('isill~ 
discretion as to choice of pl'nalty with appl'(>l,jatioll that theil' 
duties are serious and that they are accoulltable for th(>i r 
decisions, not with the f(>('ling that tIH"\' are mitkin!! me,'!' 
tentative determinations which thc COUl'ts ('an (,llI"'(,(·t. Th~ 
jury have 110 COIICCI'II It'ith alld shollid nof be ill!nrlllf'tl Hf tllf' 
automatic (1/1/1(,0/ II'hr/'c .illd'III/·f'lIt of drill" is impo,w'ri. lind o[ 
course they should not be misillfol'Dl(,u (as they illfereutially 
1 
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were here) concerning this court's powers. Argument such as 
that of the deputy district attorncy above quoted improperly 
dimillishes the jury's recognition of their duties and re-
sponsibilities and powcrs." (52 Ca1.2d at pp. 26.27; italics 
added.) 
While Linden relied upon two propositions, the second, 
and more significant, developed the danger of involving the I 
jury in matters with which it had no concern. The eourt first 
explained that the argument misinforllled the jury as to the 
power of this court. In particular, the contention improperly 
implied that this court could substitute its judgment as to 
choice of punishment. Thus Lilldell stated that "of course 
they should not be misinformed . . . concerning this court's 
powers." The court's second and more basic point was simply 
that the automatic appeal in death penalty cases should be of 
no concern to the jury, since to inform it of the possibility of 
this appeal improperly diminished its own sense of respon-
sibility. 
The latter reasoning in Linden finds support in People v. 
Sampsell (1950) 34 Ca1.2d 757 [214 P.2d 813], in which case 
the prosecutor argued that "the State of California has what 
is known as an automatic appeal in a death case, and it is not 
entirely your responsibility. YOllr verdict must be approved 
in a death case by the Supreme COllrt of the State of Cali-
fornia ... to be sure that the Supreme Court is in agreement 
with your verdict. So it is not all your responsibility." (34 
Ca1.2d at p. 762.) Of this argument the court said "the dis-
trict attorney's remarks concerning the function of this 
court where an automatic appeal is taken ... constitute re-
prehensible conduct which is not to be condoned." (ld. at p~ 
765.) 
If Linden and Sampsell condemn the argument which may 
diminish the jury's sense of responsibility, the instruction 
whieh works that result is necessarily erroneous. 'Vords of 
instruction of the trial judge are more likely to effect preju-
dice than the words of argument of the prosecutor. Moreover, 
if the jury cannot be told of the automatic appeal which docs 
not enable the Supreme Court to reduce the penalty, it 
should not be told of a procedure which permits the trial 
court to change with finality the very decision rendered by 
the jury. 
The recent ease of People v. Ashley (1063) 59 Cal.2d 339, 
[29 Cal.Rptr. 16, 379 P.2d 496], does not affl'ct the r\llings of 
Linden and Sampsell. The defendant in Ashley, an automatic 
) 
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appeal case, argu('d that the pr('~ellt instruction effected error 
because it misled tll(' jury in failing to add that the court is 
empowereu to reduce the sentence only if defendant moYes 
for a !lew trial. Although in A.shley we noted the technical 
inadeqnacy of the instruction, we found that the error could 
not possibly have misled the jury. The Ashley opinion neith-
er cites Linden on this point nor passes upon thc instant 
argument that the possibility of the court's reduction of the 
sentence should not concern the jury because of its tendency 
to reduce the jury's sense of responsibility. Thus Ashley 
considers only one of the grounds discussed in Linden, name-
ly the error in misinforming or misleading the jury as to the 
actual post-conviction procedures, and does not discuss the 
second and separate ground relating to the impropriety of a 
correct instruction as to the automatic appeal. .Justice Peters 
summarizes by stating, "the jury could not possibly have 
been misled, by the technical incompleteness of the instruc-
tion." (59 Cal.2d at p. 365; italics added.) 
The theoretical considerations which lie behind the prohi-
bition of the introduction of alien matters in the guilt phase 
of the trial may very well apply to the penalty phase. In the 
guilt phase the accepted rules forbid the jury from resolving 
doubts in favor of conviction upon the hypoth('sis that an 
appeal can cure the possible error or that the defendant may 
obtain parole or a pardon. Indeed, the clear weight of author-
ity holds that the jury should not reach a compromise of the 
issue of guilt and find a conviction because appeal may cure 
this error,12 or because the Governor may grant a pardon, IS 
or because a defpndant may obtain a light sent('nce or par-
ole. 14 California decisions accord with this view.15 
Some cases extend this philosophy to the function of the 
12United States v. Fiorito (7th Cir. 1962) 300 F.::!d 424; Blackwell v. 
State (1918) 76 Fla. 124 [79 So. 731, 1 A.L.R. 502]; Kelly v. State 
(1936) 210 Ind. 380 [3 N.E.2d (};"i] ; State v. Kring (I8n) 64 Mo. 591 ; 
State v. Biggerstaff (1896) 17 Mont. 510 [-!3 P. 709]; People v. 
Johnson (1940) ::!84 N.Y. 182 [30 N.E.2d 465, 132 A.L.R. 675]; State v. 
Clark (1961) 2~7 Ore. 391 [362 P.2d 33;,]; Gray v. State (1950) 191 
Tenn. 526 [235 S.W.Zd 20]; Crow v. State (1894) 33 Tex.Crim.Rep. 264 
[26 S.W. 209]. 
13Commonu:calth v. Mills (lV-t4) 3':;0 Pa. 476 [39 A.2d 572]. 
14People v. Suhlol (1926) 3~2 II!. 540 [153 N.E. 727]; Pollard v. 
State (1929) 201 Ind. 180 [166 N.E. 654] ; State v. Tennant (1927) 204 
Iowa 130 [214 N.W. 708]; Shoemaker v. State (1%1) 228 Md. 462 [180 
A.2d 682]; cf. People v. Sherwood (W36) 271 N.Y. 427 [3 N.E.2d 
581]. 
lIIE.g., People v. Riser (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 566 [305 P.2d 1). 
') 
652 PEOPLE v. l\IORSE [60 C.2d 
jury in general, including thc imposition of sent('nce, and 
broadly forbid the presentation of matters that may weaken 
the juror's sense of responsibility.16 Thus, on the specific 
point of imposing the death penalty, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey in State v. J[01l1lt (1959) 30 N. J. 195 [152 A.2d 
343J, lleld that the court improperly iustructed the jury that 
itc; choice of the death penalty was not nccessarily conclusive. 
The court stated that "when the trial court interrupted to 
stress that the jury's omission of a recommendation would 
not necessarily mean death to the defendant because' we have 
appeal courts and everything else, so a lot of things could 
happen,' .,. it tended to dilute the jury's crucial sense of 
responsibility." (152 A.2d at p. 351.) The North Carolina 
Supreme Court in State v. Little (1947) 228 N. C. 417 [45 
S.E.2d 542], found prejudicial error in the prosecutor's ar- I 
gument that even if the defendant were sentenced to death 
there would be a 40 percent chance that his sentence would . 
be commuted to life. (See State v. Hawley (1948) 229 N. C. 
167 [48 S.E.2d 35].) 
Concluding for the foregoing reasons that the iustruction 
improperly called to· the jury's attention the judge's power 
to reduce the death sentence to life imprisonment, we note 
that the instruction additionally stated that the jury could 
also consider the possibility that the Governor could so re-
duce the sentence. The vice of the latter instruction parallels 
that of the former. Both statements tend to diminish the 
jury's sense of obligation; they both infuse into the issue 
factors that do not belong there. To the extent that previous 
cases permit instruction or argument that the court or Gover-
nor may reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment, they 
erroneously permit the importation of extraneous matter to 
the jury rooms; they should accordingly be disapproved. l1 
We have no doubt that these errors in directing the atten-
tion of the jury to the roles of Adult Authority, judge and 
Governor, by means of argument, evidence and instruction in 
the instant case, prejudicially influenced the jury. Moreover, 
after deliberating for one day, the jury specifically asked "to 
hear again the court's instructions re the third phase, in 
1eState v. Mount (1959) 30 N.J. 195 [152 A.2d 343] ; PeopZ8 v. 
Johnson (1940) 284 N.Y. 182 [30 N.E.2d 465, 132 A.L.R. 675) ; State 
v. Little (1947) 228 N.C. 417 [45 S.E.2d 542); Gray v. State (1950) 
191 Tenn. 526 [235 S.W.2d 20] ; see United States v. Fiorito (7th Cir. 
1962) 300 F.2d 424. 
17 See in. 5, BUprG. 
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clarification of reference to possible consequences." The 
court then reread the above-mentioned instruction. The jury 
then asked additional questions relating to the alternative 
death or life sentences. Thus the jury, while deliberating 
upon the death penalty, was aware of, and had repeatcd to it, 
the facts concerning the roles of the Adult Authority, the 
trial judge and the Governor. Furthermore, the trial court 
affirmath'ely instructed the jury that it could consider these 
facts. Whatever the reasons this court might have found in 
the record in Linden "to avoid an otherwise indicated rever-
sal," we find in the record here no justification for conclud-
ing that the error was not prejudicial insofar as concerns the 
fixing of penalty. To the contrary, after examination of the 
entire cause, including the evidence, we are of the opinion 
that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to 
defendant as to penalty would have been reached in the ab-
sence of the error. 
[7] In view of the prior decisions as to the subject matter 
of the instruction, defendant's failure to object to it should 
not foreclose his opportunity to present these issues on ap-
peal. Such an objection at the trial level under the existing 
rulings would have been useless and unavailing. 
[6b] In conclusion, we believe that the instructions as to 
the judge's and Governor's possible reduction of the death 
penalty tend to mislead the jury into assuming that the ren- i 
dition of the penalty initiates a chain of proceedings by the 
court and the Governor which will achieve a reweighing of 
the sentence and possibly produce its nullification. [Id] 
The instructions and evidence of the Adult Authority'S 
possible grant of parole invite speculative argument to the 
jury and surmise by it of the possible improper release of a 
defendant to society in the future; yet that matter does not 
truly lie in its province but in the expert judgment of the 
Adult Authority. In sum, the instructions foster the dual 
vices of foisting upon the jury alien issues and concomitantly 
diluting its own sense of responsibility. 
Our rule is a minority one which we have only lately 
adopted. One jurisdiction has reversed its former approval of 
these instructions even though they had been given for a 
longer period than here. These erroneous instructions should 
be uprooted from our law before they become a verbal jungle 
of error; planted in the jurors' minds, they bear their own 
fruit of confusion. 
) 
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B. AlleGed errors in the Guilt trial. 
1. Prosecutor's charGe of false testimony. 
[8] The court did 110t crr in overruling a defense objec-
tion to the prosecutor's clJarge in oral argument that defend. 
ant testified falsely. In view of defendant's conflicting state-
ments, the prosecutor drew a legitimate inference from the 
evidence that defendant falsely stated tllat during the week· 
end of the crimes he had used dangerous drugs. Such infer· 
ences, limited to the evidence adduced at trial, constitute 
proper argument. (People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 562 
[21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985] ; People v. Lopez (1913) 21 
Cal.App. 188, 191 [131 P. 104] ; People v. Glaze (1903) 139 
Cal. 154, 159.160 [72 P. 965].) 
The prosecutor emphasized that defendant had told the 
police that he had not been under the influence of drugs or 
narcotics. At that time defendant volunteered "If I thought 
it would do me any good in court I would tell you I was 
really strung out." Subsequently defendant testified that on 
the Saturday afternoon immediately preceding the erimes he 
had obtained a quantity of dangerous dru/:,'S in Tijuana, llad 
taken an excessive dosage, and would 110t have committed the 
crimes if he had not been under the influence of the drugs. 
Yet Jack Drummond, his companion on the Saturday in 
question, testified that he and defendant had been together 
most of the day; such testimony practically nullified defend· 
ant's opportunity to leave the country to purchase the drugs. 
The only testimony in support of defendant's contention 
that he had obtained and consumed drugs that Saturday was 
that of a fellow tankmate, facing trial for a felony narcotics 
violation, who maintained that he and defendant had been in 
. Tijuana. The prosecution, however, seriously impeached that 
testimony. Under the circumstances, the prosecution merely 
emphasized one reasonable interpretation of the evidence. 
2. Instruction as to intoxication. 
[9] The court refused to give defendant's requested in· 
struction bascd upon People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 716, 
727 [336 P.2d 492]. The instruction read as follows: "You 
are further instructed that expert evidence of unconsciotls-
ness resulting from voluntary intoxication is received, not as 
a 'complete defense' negating capacity to commit any crime, 
but as a 'partial defense' negating specific mental state es-
sential to a particular crime." (Italics added.) The court, 
however, instructed the jury that: "Specific intent to kill is 
not a necessary element of second degree murder, but is a 
) 
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necessary element of the kind of first dcgree murder de-
scribed as willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. " 
\Vithout passing' on the merits of the requested instruction, 
we believe that the complete answer to defendant's conten-
tion lies in his failure to adduce expert evidence of uncon-
sciousness reSUlting from voluntary iutoxication. In fact, the 
opinion of the expert witness, as implemented by the testi-
mony of defendant's acquaintances who observed his rele-
vant beha\-ior, defeated any possible inference of defendant's 
voluntary intoxication to the point of unconsciousness. Sev-
eral witnesses testified that defendant's behavior in their 
presence during the weekend in question appeared normal. 
Dr. Lentz, WI10 later testificd as an expert witness for the 
defense, had, as a court-appointed psychiatrist, submitted to 
the court a report indicating that defendant's asserted intox-
ication from drugs during the weekend "although not excul-
patory, might be considered mitigating." At the trial, how-
ever, he stated tlmt the benzedrine and barbiturate drugs 
which defendant claimed to have taken would be incapable of 
producing toxic psychosis and that unless defendant had 
reached a degree of drug intoxication readily apparent to lay 
observers he would remain capable of calculated judgment. 
"People on the strl'et would be able to say, well, there was 
something odd about tllis reaction. ... This state, or this 
severity ... would surely sho,v to anybody." Dr. Lentz 
further testified that in his opinion defendant, at the time of 
the perpetration of the crimes, possessed the ability to pre-
meditate and deliberate. 
3. Instructions as to murder by means of lyinfJ in wait. 
[10] Although defendant contends that the evidence did 
not justify the eourt in instructing the jury that" All murder 
which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait is murder in 
the first degree," ample evidence supports this instruction; 
defendant confessed to eonduct which justifies it. 
The jury in its discretion could reject defendant's Wl'SiOll 
of the criminal episode as described at the trial and accept, 
instead, his earlier tape-record cd statements to the police. 
Officer Morrison verified the transcript of the tape-recorded 
statements as required for its introduction. (People v. Wo-
jahn (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 135, 146 [337 P_2d 192] ; People 
v. Wootan (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 481 [15 Cal.Rptr. 833].) 
The tape recording and transcript were admissible evidence. 
(People v. Stephens (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 6;):1, 660 [2:i() 
P.2d 1033] ; People v. Wojahn, Sllpra, p. 146.) The trallscript 
) 
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implemented the tape reeol'lliug in those instances wlwre the 
tape was unclear; this CO\ll·t has apPl'oved the above proce-
dure ill previous deeisiolls. tPeople v. I(ctchcl (1963) 59 Cal. 
2d 503, 519 [30 Cal.Hptr. 538, 3S1 P.2d 394] ; see also People 
v. Dupree (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 60, 68 [319 P.2d 39] ; Peo-
ple v. Albert (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 729, 742 [6 Cal.Rptr. 
473].) 
Defendant, in his tape-recorded confession, stated tlmt he 
picked up the rock in his front yard early Sunday morning 
with the intent to kill someone. After his mother let him into 
the house and they had each retired to their respective Sh~l'Ji­
ing quarters, defendant called to her, perhaps saying" Hpy, 
come here for a second." He waited in the dark of the bed-
room corridor until she arose and opened her bedroom door; 
then he struck her. 
The instruction concerning murder by lying in wait ap-
propriately stemmed from these events; the record affords i 
evidence of defendant's intention to kill and of his perpetra-
tion of his mother's murder by means of lying in wait for 
the opportulle moment to strike. (See People v. Slttic (1953) 
41 Ca1.2d 483, 492-493 [261 P.2d 241]; People v. Byrd 
(1934) 42 Ca1.2d 200, 208-209 [266 P.2d 505] ; People v. Tltt-
/till (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 92, 99-101 [187 P.2d 16].) 
4. Instruction as to reasonable doltbt as related to the degree 
0/ the murder. 
[11a] Because defendant addressed his argument prinri-
pally to the question of first or second degree murder, he 
maintains that the eourt should have specifically pointed the 
instructions concerning reasonable doubt and circumstantial 
evidence to the issue of degree. Defendant did not submit 
instructions in this regard but nevertheless contends that 
"By giving the circumstantial evidence instruction, said in-
struction discussed the fact of the defendant's right to 
acquittal. Since this was not properly before the jury, it is 
the defendant's contention that the instructions should haye 
been made more understandable by relating them to the qUE'S-
tion of first or second degree." (Italics added.) 
[12] Although in criminal cases the court must instruct 
the jury on its own motion as to applicable general lei!al 
principles, even though the parties fail to propose such in-
structions, the court need not render particular instructions 
as to specific points unless the parties request them or they 
are essential to a fair trial. (See People v. J ack.~on (1963) j!l 
Cal.2d 375, 379-380 [29 Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 P.2<1 937] ; People 
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v. Warren (1940) 16 Cal.2J 103, 116-117 [104P.2d 1024].) 
rUb] Defendant's plea of not guilty remained before the 
court; all matter ill cOlltrOYCrsy under that plea continued as 
live issues before the jury. Likewise, instructions which em-
braced defendant's ,. right to acquittal" properly remainedl 
before the jury. Neither the court nor defense counsel could 
withdraw from the jury's consideration the question of de-
fendant's innocence without his personal consent. (People v. 
RUllers (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 301 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d\ 
892) .) 
The general instructions as to circnmstantial evidence and! 
reasonable doubt were, moreover, implemented by the follow-'i 
ing instruction as to the degree of the crime: "When, upon 
the trial of a charge of murder, the jury is convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been com-
mitted by a defendant, but has a reasonable doubt whether' 
such murder was of the first or second degree, the jury must 
give to such defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a 
verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree." The 
court thus apprised the jury that it should consider not 
merely the issue of first degree murder or acquittal but that, 
in determining the degree of the crime, it should give de-
fendant the benefit of any doubt. We cannot, therefore, con-
clude that defendant suffered prejUdice in the court's in-
structions. 
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to the penal-
ty. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., and 
Peek, J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I would affirm 
the judgment in its entirety, to wit: (a) finding the defend-
ant guilty of murder in the first degree and (b) fixing the 
penalty at death. 
